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By James Leibold
The mainstream media, both Western and Chinese, seem to be struggling to make sense of the deadly
riots that broke out in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi last week. Well-worn explanations on both sides
have largely failed to grasp the complexities behind this new, unprecedented wave of mass communal
violence in China. Not since the dying days of the Manchu Qing empire has China witnessed this sort
of spontaneous ethnically-based violence.

With initial headlines like “Chinese riot police, Muslims clash in northwestern city,” “China in deadly
crackdown after Uighurs go on the rampage,” and “Uighurs cling to life in People’s hospital as China’s
wounds weep,” the foreign media painted the usual picture of the Chinese Communist Party and its
security apparatuses brutally cracking down on the repressed and helpless minorities.
In much of the early reporting the emphasis lay on “the heavy-handed use of force by the Chinese
security forces” and the subsequent tightening of media and Internet control, rather than the mob rule
and racial retribution being doled out by Uighur and Han youth alike. When searching for answers to
this wanton and impulsive brutality, the foreign media wheeled out its usual critique of statesponsored violence against the Uighurs, Tibetans and other ethnic minorities in China.
Yet, this time, many of the dead and wounded appear to have been Han rather than ethnic minorities.
The confusion surrounding this misidentification caused theLondon Evening Standard, among other
media outlets, to use a photo of two blood-soaked Han women to invocate the “blood and defiance”
and “Tiananmen’s spirit” of a group of Uighur women who confronted security forces several days
after the initial incident.
Seeking to counter this familiar criticism, the official Chinese media went on the front foot; and, in
sharp contrast to its handling of last year’s unrest in Tibet, immediately reported the Urumqi violence
in graphic detail, hoping to define rather than suppress the message both domestically and
internationally. Yet, its coverage provided no fresh explanations, reverting instead to familiar clichés
and slogans.
The Chinese media was quick to stress how unidentified “rioters” and “outlaws,” “controlled and
instigated from abroad” by “the “Uighur Dalai Lama” Rebiya Kadeer, unleashed “the most inhumane
atrocities too horrible to look at.” Behind headlines like “Recalling the nightmare: witnesses’ account
of Xinjiang riot,” and “Ravaged by riot, Xinjiang’s capital in horror,” the Chinese media sought to
expose those “evil” and “external” forces that left Urumqi “blood tainted,” while stressing the “heroic

deeds” of all ethnic groups in China to uphold “national unity and social stability” in the face of
international criticism and outside meddling.

While details remain sketchy, eyewitness accounts tell a different story: the outbreak of spontaneous
communal violence between China’s Han ethnic majority and the increasingly marginalized Uighur
inhabitants of Xinjiang. On the evening of July 5th, several hundred Uighur youths went on a bloody
rampage following a peaceful demonstration over a separate incident of ethnic violence at a
Guangdong toy factory. The results, according to Chinese government figures, was the destruction of
thousands of dollars worth of property, the death of nearly two hundred innocent civilians and another
thousand injured.
In the days that followed, bands of roving Han vigilantes armed with kitchen knives, hammers, metal
pipes and other improvised weapons sought to mete out revenge in the Uighur suburbs of the city.
Both this incident and last year’s unrest in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa and other Tibetan areas
represent a worrying new wave of ethnic violence (not only physical violence on the streets of cities
like Lhasa and Urumqi, but also virtual violence on the numerous ethnically-based blogging sites on
the Chinese Internet). And here the well-worn paradigms of state repression and foreign incitement
conceal more than they reveal.
The root causes behind this spike in communal tension are far more complex and multidimensional
than the media would have us believe. It is true that state-sponsored Han migration has culturally and
economically marginalized the once majority Uighur population of Xinjiang—a situation that has been
made worse by the recent global economic downturn.
But many Han migrants are themselves unhappy, and they are increasingly pointing a finger at the
state’s extensive affirmative action policies (youhui zhengce) that provides special economic, cultural
and educational benefits to the minorities. These policies, they claim, only serve to mollycoddle the
“backward” and “simple” minorities, while rendering the naturally superior Han second-class citizens.
Caught in-between these increasingly polarized and agitated ethnic communities is the Chinese state,
which, rather than orchestrating the brutal oppression of the non-Han minorities, finds itself
increasingly powerless to stop the spiralling circle of ethnic hatred which its policies helped to foster in
the first place.
In a recent online report on the violence in the Tibetan region last year, the progressive, Beijing-based
Gongmeng (Open Constitution Initiative) think tank explored some of the major social causes behind
this wellspring of violent discontent. The report claimed that the rapid (almost dizzying) pace of statedirected change in frontier regions like Tibet and Xinjiang has failed to bring any real benefit to the
vast majority of the minority inhabitants in these regions, instead resulting in growing income

disparity, high education dropout rates, growing unemployment and underemployment, cultural
dislocation and a growing sense of powerlessness. While asserting that “the state’s major preferential
policies and support have not been of any effective benefit to the main body of Tibetan people,” the
report also speaks of the rise of a new Tibetan “aristocracy,” whose legitimacy rests on central
government affiliation rather than traditional clan or religious ties, making it easier for this new elite to
turn a blind eye to the negative social consequences of imposed modernization.
The report’s authors argue that the rich tradition of “Han departmentalism” (hanzu benwei zhuyi),
which seeks to compartmentalize different ethnic communities under a hollow ideology of Confucian
harmony, continues to hinder effective political responses to these problems. The structure of
governance in autonomous regions like Tibet and Xinjiang means that, on the one hand, minority
cadres have carved out “deep-rooted local power elite networks” and seek to protect their personal
interests by blaming all social unrest on “foreign forces” as “fig leaves to conceal their mistakes in
governance and to repress social discontent,” while on the other hand, continued discrimination and
social marginalization among ordinary, non-Han minorities hinders their identification with the PRC
state and any shared concept of nationhood.

In seeking to understand this troubling rise in ethnic-based violence in China, we need to look beyond
the usual bogeymen at the increasingly torn fabric of Reform Era Chinese society. In the end, the over
twenty years of rapid economic growth has unleashed as many demons as it has benefits—evident in
the increasing number of ordinary citizens who are turning to ethnic profiling and violence to vent
their shared frustrations. The result is a burgeoning level of internal racism that should concern us all.
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